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This submission concerns itself with the social and political measures and conditions that are 
essential counterparts to the fiscal compact and associated treaties. It examines the economic 
situation in Europe and the prospects for Eurozone recovery attaching to the ratification of 
the Fiscal Compact. It shows that the missing link in the new economic architecture is the 
socio-economic domain: there is no sign of the development of a „social compact‟ to 
accompany the deepening of integration within the Eurozone, despite the „European model‟ 
having been built upon the combination of fiscal discipline and strong social and economic 
investments. We then outline a series of problems with the turn to technocratic administration 
in the fiscal compact and associated measures. This leads us to examine the „crisis of 
legitimacy‟ within the sphere of European affairs and EU decision-making in Ireland and 
argue that the policy system needs to significantly enhance its capabilities to promote genuine 
deliberation on European issues. The centralisation of power in government needs to be 
counter-balanced by a greater contribution from the courts to the debate and by giving the 
Oireachtas significantly enhanced powers to hold the government to account in EU matters. 
 
A European Model? 
Europe‟s crisis remains volatile. The peripheral countries continue to struggle with massive 
debt, banking remains flawed and fragile, austerity policies are being implemented across the 
region and growth is either negative or minimal across the entire eurozone. There is open 
disagreement in the core countries (and even within the German government itself) about 
whether to let Greece go bust and leave the euro. The chances of further tumultuous events 
remain high.  
 
Despite the widespread criticism of European blundering and apparent indecisiveness, in 
practice the dominant policy response has been consistent since early in the crisis. The most 
immediate strategy has been to build a „firewall‟ around the European financial system, by 
providing funding to Europe‟s banks but also by pushing the responsibility for banking debt 
firmly onto states and, therefore, citizens. It is not that Europe has been slow to develop a 
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„bank resolution scheme‟ to manage the process of banks going bust – avoiding getting to a 
bank resolution process has been a goal of policy. Changes in financial sector regulation have 
focused on capital requirements rather than trading activity and some limited write downs of 
debts to private sector creditors (in Greece) have been combined with massive injections of 
cheap money into Europe‟s banks in recent months.  
 
This safeguarding of banking has been twinned with the promotion of a variety of austerity 
policies across Europe, in the interests of reducing state debts and deficits and reducing the 
threat posed to the euro by the rising costs of borrowing for governments (or „sovereigns‟). 
Funds have been mobilised through the development of the European Stability Mechanism 
rescue funds. Alongside this a series of policy initiatives (including the „six pack‟ and „two 
pack‟ of new regulations and the „fiscal compact‟ itself) have toughened budget rules, 
implemented deeper and more powerful EU Commission oversight of national budgets and 
economies, imposed automatic sanctions for violation of rules and increasingly sought to 
embed all of these as firmly as possible in national legislation and even constitutions.   
This has been consolidated in recent months into a clear political project for the future of 
Europe, with a strong legal basis. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union was adopted on 31
st
 January 2012, without the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic – and potentially subject to a referendum in the Republic 
of Ireland, France and elsewhere. The fiscal compact is anchored in part in the ideologies of 
the dominant parties in France and Germany and may well shift if the French socialists or 
German social democrats return to government (with both parties expressing deep scepticism 
about the strategy). It is also, however, based on a profound uncertainty and fear about how 
Europe‟s financial system might fare if the system of liabilities built up in the open capital 
markets of the 2000s unravel completely. 
 
However, in recent speeches to her Christian Democratic Union party, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel has argued that such policies, combined with efforts to improve competitiveness, 
represent a strongly pro-European response to the crisis. She argues that such measures will 
rebuild trust in finances and between governments and will require greater strengthening of 
the centre in Europe and deeper political union.  
 
Rediscovering the European Model (I): Towards A Socio-Economic Compact  
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This approach has caused some frustration in the US and UK, „liberal political economies‟ 
which have ironically taken what is apparently a more Keynesian approach to the crisis, 
making greater use of „quantitative easing‟ (increasing the money supply) than in continental 
Europe. Nonetheless, Chancellor Merkel can make a strong case that fiscal discipline has 
been a central plank of the European model in the past – the continental and Nordic 
economies have always been less likely to run budget deficits than the liberal political 
economies.  
 
However, in these Christian Democratic and Social Democratic economies, this fiscal 
rectitude has historically been part of a much broader social and economic compact – the 
other elements of which are missing in the current European fiscal compact. 
 
A crucial element in those models was a focus not on austerity but on prudent egalitarian 
productive investment (the less widely recognised side of Keynes‟ economics). Where the 
bailout programmes have emphasised competitiveness through cost cutting and weakening 
social protections, the European model was based on quality production, worker participation 
and strong social protections and investments.  
The compact then is an attempt to manage Europe through the short term crisis by imposing 
discipline on government finances, betting that the process of „deleveraging‟ of debts will be 
easier to manage through states and citizens than through a restructuring of the financial 
system. The additional social and economic measures that were crucial to the success of such 
fiscally disciplined economies as Germany and the Nordics are not part of the promised road 
to recovery of the European project.  
 
There are significant problems with this strategy. The most obvious is the threat to the euro 
through the pressure on government finances and the unwillingness of private lenders to 
finance government borrowing in the European periphery. The fiscal rules in place in the 
2000s have already notably failed to prevent the current crisis. Four years into the crisis, the 
pro-cyclical austerity policies seem almost certain to continue to deepen recession and delay 
recovery. In the medium to long term, the fiscal rules in the new treaty lock out counter-
cyclical measures and go a long way to making Keynesian economic management illegal.  
The compact then is a bet that austerity and technocracy can outlast these economic, political 
and legitimation problems long enough to allow the eurozone economy to begin to grow once 
more. The rules may become the first block in Chancellor Merkel‟s „bridge to the future‟, 
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becoming the basis of new relations of trust across Europe. But the other elements that might 
make such an outcome more likely are missing, or suppressed. In such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the peripheral countries fear that the fiscal compact will simply quarantine the 
healthier economies in Europe from the difficulties across the eurozone as a whole. 
There are real dilemmas here – uneven development in the European Union is a serious 
problem and interacts disastrously with liberal capital markets and state deficits. But it is 
striking how small a role has been given to European institutions such as the structural funds 
programme or the European Investment Bank in promoting an investment-led recovery. 
Indeed, it seems likely that structural funds will go unspent in the current period. The 
marketisation of continental European banking has fuelled a turn away from productive 
investment and the funds provided to European banks are still as likely to be used for 
financial trading as for productive lending. The trillion or more in liquidity provided to banks 
comes with few strings attached in terms of the banks‟ role in recovery. Policy decisions that 
could provide national governments with fiscal space to generate economic recovery, 
including rescheduling debt repayments, are largely ignored. Cross-national investments in 
vital infrastructure for the knowledge economy could be encouraged further. Institutional 
changes in terms of financial regulation, promotion of active labour market policies and 
industrial upgrading – vital to recovery across the periphery – could be advanced. A politics 
of rule-making and rectitude, necessary in many respects, must be accompanied by a politics 
of society-building and recovery. 
 
It may well be that the prospect of a fiscal compact and early moves in that direction will 
provide enough stability in the banking, bond and stock markets, and the eurozone economy 
to avoid a disastrous short term meltdown. In the not so long run, however, the European 
approach will need to go well beyond the fiscal compact to generate growth, employment and 
become a motor of recovery in the world economy.  
 
Rediscovering the European Model (II): Governance and Democracy 
As noted above, European policies and institutions exist that could be mobilised. The 
problem lies in the ability of politics in Europe to generate what sociologist Art Stinchcombe 
calls a „solid enough future‟ that could be the basis for recovery. The tensions between core 
and periphery are clear. The violent confrontations in Greece are only the most visible sign of 
serious damage to the image of the EU, especially outside the continental „core‟. But the 
tensions within the core itself are also significant – the French project of Europeanisation as a 
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model of projecting influence on a global stage is potentially significantly at odds with the 
German projection of its model of a competitive exporting economy onto the European 
Union as a whole. Within Germany itself, the political tensions are also serious – while their 
once investment-oriented banks partied in international capital markets in the 2000s, German 
workers and citizens saw some of the lowest increases in living standards across the EU. 
Little wonder their appetite for funding European recovery is poor. 
 
However, the politics of the compact appears unlikely to live up to the demands of 
revitalising the European model. The compact is based largely on increasingly naked inter-
governmental inequalities in power and intensified technocratic domination – neither wildly 
popular with Europe‟s citizens. Recent decades have seen a significant shift in the relations 
between governments and bureaucracies within Europe. From 1985 to 1994 the European 
Commission under Jacques Delors was arguably the central actor in the European Union and 
widely seen as a champion of the smaller states. Indeed, eurobarometer surveys show that it 
is the citizens of the smaller member states that most trust the EU.  
 
However, the Commission bureaucracy has been marginalised in the past decade by the 
growing assertiveness of the major powers within the Union.  In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the Commission is now being brought back in but as the disciplinary arm of an inter-
governmental set of rules. More broadly, agencies such as the European Central Bank are 
playing a key role, officially outside the control of European citizens. In Italy technocrats are 
directly installed in government while Greece, Ireland and Portugal are all under direct 
technocratic oversight through bailout programmes. 
 
Eurobarometer surveys show that the percentage of people in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain who „tend to trust the EU‟ fell from 57% before the crisis in April 2008 to 42% in May 
2011. A vote based on the fear of being left out of the EU will inevitably go along with an 
erosion of trust in its institutions and should not provide any comfort to those who seek to 
secure the future of Europe.   
 
The legitimacy of technocratic domination rests upon expertise and objectivity. However, 
there is significant scope in applying this expertise – schedules of repayment can be changed 
and definitions of obligations to creditors can be created, contested and changed. 
Furthermore, the fiscal rules themselves build into law economic concepts and explanations 
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that are in practice both contested and extremely difficult to operationalise, even within 
international accounting and statistical norms. „The rules‟ cannot substitute for political 
construction of social compacts.  
Where the successful European economies were characterised by a diverse network of 
governance institutions, centralisation and technocracy are the dominant modes of 
governance in the fiscal compact. Rather than promoting the „European model‟ anew the 
compact promotes a single piece of the cluster of policies and institutions as the key policy 
for securing Europe‟s future.  
 
Enhancing Ireland’s Capacity to Engage with Europe (I): Bringing the Judiciary Back 
In 
The referendum debate is clearly at risk of developing into a rather predictable political „face 
off‟.It is noteworthy that most of the antecedent debate focused on the relative costs and 
benefits of ratifying the treaty directly via the people or indirectly through the Oireachtas, 
which effectively means through a decision of government.  
 
This shows how „thin‟ our institutions of political debate and deliberation are in practice. The 
new focus on European issues offers an opportunity to deepen Ireland‟s institutional 
engagement with European debates and policies. This deepening would also strengthen the 
quality of our democracy at a time when European governance is becoming more 
technocratic. We suggest an enhanced role for the judiciary and the Oireachtas in deliberating 
on European policies. 
 
The Supreme Court has been singularly absent from Ireland‟s engagement with European 
integration for most of the last quarter century. Unlike many member states of the EU we 
have had no national judicial consideration of the relationship between national sovereignty 
and EU supranationalism. And in the light of the far reaching consequences of ratifying the 
Fiscal Treaty this is an intervention that was badly needed. Significant uncertainties regarding 
the legal implications of a Yes or a No vote remain.  
 
As the guardian of the Irish Constitution the Supreme Court has played an important role in 
maintaining the balance of power between our domestic political institutions and ensured that 
no one institution could garner for itself powers which the constitution did not bestow. The 
European integration process has presented the most formidable challenge to that ordering of 
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the domestic political architecture: vectors of so-called „Europeanization‟ have helped to re-
configure the domestic political landscape in quite specific ways, and, as the „European‟ layer 
of governance in Ireland has effectively overlaid the „domestic‟, the practical institutional 
effect of such patterns of Europeanization has been to „hollow out‟ the constitutionally 
prescribed functions of the Oireachtas. Because over time more and more policy areas have 
„migrated‟ from the national to the European or supranational level the decision-making input 
and authority of purely domestic actors has been continually eroded. If the Irish people say 
„yes‟ to the Fiscal Compact that pattern is likely to continue. 
 
It is ironic that the absence of the Supreme Court from Ireland‟s European journey stems 
largely from one of its own judgments, the celebrated Crotty case of 1987. The most 
important effect of the judgment was that subsequent to its delivery Irish governments 
interpreted the Court‟s position to mean that all future changes to EU treaties had to be 
decided by popular referendum. The Supreme Court has had virtually nothing to say about 
the cumulative transfers of sovereignty to Brussels and the trajectory of ever deeper 
integration pursued by the EU via the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon.  
 
There were two reasons in particular to support a referral of the Fiscal Compact to the 
Supreme Court. The first is the nature of the Fiscal Compact itself and the fundamental 
change it portends in the management of the Irish economy. The Fiscal Compact does not 
merely constitute an organic or benign evolutionary development in Ireland‟s economic 
relationship with Brussels. If passed into law it would provide for a permanent and deeply 
penetrative oversight of Irish fiscal policy by EU authorities, embedding this external 
economic control in domestic legislation and specifying automatic sanctions for transgression 
which could condemn this country to lengthy periods of economic stagnation. The fiscal 
compact is the latest (and may yet prove the most significant) in a series of EU supranational 
economic bargains that can only be understood as a form of advanced „Europeanization‟ of 
the domestic legislative landscape.  
 
Some commentators such as legal expert Dr. Gavin Barrett of UCD and economist Professor 
Philip Lane of Trinity College have argued that the Fiscal Compact represents „much ado 
about nothing‟ i.e only a legal formalization of the instruments the EU has already put in 
place (such as the so-called „six pack‟ measures) to toughen up fiscal and budgetary rules 
within the Eurozone. Whilst it remains to be seen how constraining a ratified Fiscal Compact 
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will prove for member state governments as they seek to conduct their own fiscal policies in 
the future, there is at the very least an inherent danger that the quasi-automaticity of many of 
the measures included in the Compact will significantly tie the hands of government and 
continue the trajectory of austerity well into the future, denying the domestic economy the 
vital oxygen provided by a return to more or less normal levels of economic growth. 
 
A Supreme Court judgment on the fiscal compact would have thrown light on these evolving 
supranational fiscal arrangements and determined whether they were compatible with the 
principles of sovereignty enshrined in Bunreacht na hÉireann. As importantly a Supreme 
Court hearing might also have helped define the parameters and deeper long term 
significance of Ireland‟s constitutional relationship with the EU. In particular the Court might 
have clarified the responsibilities of and relative balance of power between our domestic 
political institutions with regard to European affairs. It will be important that we obtain a 
judicial judgment on these constitutional issues when the opportunity next presents itself.  
 
Enhancing Ireland’s Capacity to Engage with Europe (II): Enhancing Parliamentary 
Democracy 
 
This is especially crucial because of the current overwhelming imbalance in power between 
the government and the Oireachtas. Here we should take note of the practice in other 
jurisdictions where both the courts and national parliaments play a much more prominent part 
in EU decision-making. The Danish government is constitutionally obliged to take instruction 
from the European affairs committee of its national parliament, the Folketinget when it 
negotiates with EU partners. Thus Danish MPs have an input into EU policy which their Irish 
counterparts in the Oireachtas can only dream about. 
 
The balance of power between the institutions of state is also much more nuanced in 
Germany where the Constitutional Court has been a visible and increasingly assertive actor 
within the domestic processing of EU affairs. Most recently, in September 2011, the Court 
ruled on three lawsuits brought by prominent lawyers and economists against Germany‟s 
participation in the EU bailout of Greece. Although the court rejected the substantive claim of 
the litigants it also handed them a partial victory by insisting that the Bundestag be given a 
greater role in any future bailouts and, more generally, in German decision-making on EU 
issues. In the Court‟s view the Bundestag had lost control over its constitutionally mandated 
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right to determine budget policy and thus control how German taxpayers‟ money was spent. 
The Court‟s decision means that the German government will now have to ask the Bundestag 
budget committee before it agrees to any future bailout decisions at EU level.  
 
The German case demonstrates a clear attempt to claw back power from the EU to the 
national level of decision-making, something that might seem counter-intuitive against the 
current shadow of deep recession across the continent. But it also highlights the extent to 
which national parliaments have become „victims‟ of the European integration process. 
Within individual member states this has manifested itself in the control of EU policy-making 
by a narrow stratum of executive and bureaucratic actors and the marginalization of national 
parliaments as arenas of oversight and scrutiny of governmental activity at EU level. 
 
Parliaments are central institutions in modern European systems of government. They elect 
and control the government, approve legislation, and represent the most important checks on 
the power of untrammelled executive authority, especially when they exercise functions of 
oversight and scrutiny. Yet such constitutional perspective is arguably increasingly divorced 
from reality in both the Irish and international contexts. National parliaments are almost 
without exception portrayed in the EU literature, for example,  as reactive institutions, as 
„victims‟ of the European integration process for one thing, and the broader global context in 
which foreign policy decision-making has evolved (O‟Brennan and Raunio, 2007). Within 
the Irish political system the government‟s dominance over the legislature is clearly apparent.  
 
In theory at least the Houses of the Oireachtas exercise an important role in relation to foreign 
policy; in engaging in plenary debate and providing institutional approval for international 
treaties and legislation, and in discussing issues of external relations in parliamentary 
committees and seeking to hold senior office holders to account on foreign policy. Articles 
29.5 and 29.6 of Bunreacht na hEireann explicitly set out the power of parliament in the field 
of international relations. Every international agreement to which the state becomes a party 
other than those of a technical or administrative character, must be laid before the Dail, and 
the state cannot be bound by any agreement involving a charge on public funds unless the 
terms of that agreement have been approved by the Dail. No international agreement may 
become part of domestic law of the state without the approval of the Oireachtas (White 
Paper, 1996: 332). Thus a reading of the formal powers enjoyed by the Oireachtas suggests 
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there exists an opportunity structure for TDs and senators to participate actively and 
purposively in foreign affairs.  
 
The formal institutional division of labour, however, is misleading. In this, as in other areas 
of policy-making, executive privileges outweigh and prevail over constitutionally-ordained 
parliamentary prerogatives. Michael Gallagher‟s recent (2010: 198-229) evaluation of the 
performance of the Oireachtas noted that with regard to the Dáil it was only a slight 
exaggeration “to say that all legislation passed by the Dáil emanates from the government, 
and that all legislation proposed by the government is passed by the Dáil.” This work goes on 
to describe Dáil debates as “dialogues of the deaf” with little incentive for opposition parties 
to engage constructively, and concludes that the “Dáil cannot be seen as an active participant 
in the process of making laws, let alone broader policy” while noting that the Seanad is “by 
far the weaker of the two houses.” (Ibid. 210).  
 
The reason for the relative weakness of the Irish parliament is obviously a debate that goes 
well beyond European integration.  There is little agreement, even among specialists, as to 
which are the most significant explanatory factors.  Issues which are commonly pointed to 
include the relatively clientelist nature of Irish politics and the strong party discipline 
pertaining within Irish political parties. Both of these act as structural dis-incentives toward 
active parliamentary engagement with foreign policy issues including EU policy-making. 
What we can say is that, in a comparative context, Ireland represents a readily identifiable 
case of a foreign policy system dominated by government actors and one where parliament 
signally fails to fulfil its constitutional mandate of holding the government to account. 
 
Ireland‟s membership of the EU has re-enforced existing tendencies toward governmental 
control and EU policy-making in particular has been overseen by a combination of the 
departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance and An Taoiseach, assisted by a highly effective 
civil service. There has been little or no room for the Oireachtas to assert itself, whether in 
the early stages of policy initiation or the later stages of implementation.  
 
Understanding the role of the Oireachtas (and of individual members of parliament) in EU 
decision-making seems particularly compelling in the light of the rejection of EU-related 
referendums in 2001 and 2008 and the impending prospect of a referendum on the Fiscal 
Compact. Although it is frequently alleged that the failure of earlier referendums can be 
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attributed to a so-called „democratic deficit‟ at EU level, there exists a much more important 
domestic, i.e. purely Irish democratic deficit in that the political representatives charged with 
the responsibility of holding executive authority to account seem disengaged from the 
European integration process and unable or unwilling to properly scrutinise Irish 
governmental action in the EU sphere. Members of the Oireachtas did not campaign 
forcefully for the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and many of them appeared distinctly uncomfortable 
when making public appearances or media interviews.  
 
The impression given was of a parliament which was uninformed, unimportant, remote from 
the policy-making process and essentially voiceless: „communicating Europe‟ had become a 
thankless and unwelcome (if indeed fitfully periodic) task for mainstream political 
representatives rooted in a robustly localist political culture and who themselves have both 
little opportunity to influence EU policy-making and little to gain from engaging seriously 
with EU affairs This is no small matter of concern as we set out on a fifth EU referendum 
campaign in just over a decade and one that will unfold against a backdrop of unprecedented 
economic uncertainty. 
 
The „European‟ layer of governance in Ireland has, over time, become a domestic layer as the 
boundaries of what previously were thought of as discrete national and supranational areas of 
competence have gradually dissolved. „Europeanization‟, in different forms and via a 
multitude of routes, has played a decisive part in shaping Irish foreign policy over almost four 
decades of membership. 
 
Europeanization was defined originally by Robert Ladrech (1994: 32) as „an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC [European 
Community] political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making.‟ „Europeanization‟ is hence primarily a top-down 
concept, employed for analysing the impact of European integration on developments at the 
national level... The EU creates new exit, veto, and informational opportunities for domestic 
actors and therefore changes the national opportunity structure for exerting political 
influence. The idea is thus simple: states are not homogeneous, monolithic entities and the 
process of European integration may empower certain groups or institutions while reducing 
the power of others. 
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Academic studies have demonstrated that Europeanization has re-enforced the existing 
dominance of decision-making by executive actors, leading to a phenomenon known as 
„deparliamentarization‟. National parliaments are almost without exception portrayed in the 
literature as reactive institutions, as „victims‟ of the European integration process, rather than 
purposive independent actors (O‟Brennan and Raunio 2007). According to the 
„deparliamentarization‟ thesis, the development of European integration has led to an erosion 
(or further erosion) of parliamentary control over executive office-holders. This argument is 
based both on EU constitutional rules and on the political dynamics of the policy process at 
EU level. Constitutionally, the issue is relatively straightforward. Powers which previously 
were under the jurisdiction of national legislatures have been shifted upwards to the European 
level and the European Council has become a more powerful actor than ever envisaged: a 
marked trend toward „intergovermentalism‟ within the EU has rewarded executive actors at 
the expense of domestic parliaments and national agency.  
 
Research on the impact of the EU on national politics has also provided strong support to the 
deparliamentarization thesis. Rometsch and Wessels (1996) uncovered certain similarities 
between the member states: the strengthening of the position of the prime minister, the 
central role of executive authority coupled with decentralization and flexibility in decision-
making, the bureaucratization of public policy-making, high administrative coordination in 
national EU policy, and, significantly, low involvement of national parliaments. The follow-
up volume edited by Wessels, Maurer and Mittag (2003) largely confirmed these findings. 
Despite some improvement, they concluded on a pessimistic note that „continuous deficits in 
parliaments‟ ability to play the multi-level game reduce the influence of national deputies. 
The involvement of parliaments in the EU policy-cycle remains weak and largely reactive.‟ 
(Ibid.: 433) Summing up the role of national parliaments in this policy coordination, Kassim 
(2000: 258) observed that parliaments have „very little ability to scrutinize Union proposals, 
still less to influence their content, and are able only in very exceptional cases to direct the 
actions of their respective governments.‟ Country-specific accounts of Europeanization 
largely confirm the findings of these comparative projects (O‟Brennan and and Raunio 2007). 
The protracted economic crisis which unfolded after 2008 further cemented the authority of 
governments as the central actors within the Eurozone in particular. 
 
The Irish case seems to wholly confirm these findings: patterns of Europeanisation leading to 
a strengthening of the executive and a reduced role for the Oireachtas in EU affairs. More 
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recently, in keeping with the trend toward „re-enforced intergovernmentalism‟ as the defining 
mode of interaction at EU level, the Department of an Taoiseach has taken on a much more 
prominent role, confirmed by the transfer of administrative responsibility for European affairs 
to that department in June 2011, with a second secretary general appointed. Clearly this 
important change will take time to bed down and new patterns may emerge in both the inter-
departmental constellation and the relationship between government and parliament as a 
result. What seems clear, however, is that the re-configuration represents the latest stage in a 
series which have considerably boosted the power of the Department of An Taoiseach in EU 
affairs.  
 
The Oireachtas first established a system of Community legislation scrutiny in 1973 and this 
work was later subsumed by the first Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1993. However, 
in March 1995 the Oireachtas set up a separate Joint Committee on European Affairs (JCEA) 
which subsumed the JCSLEC. The most important subsequent changes occurred after the 
Nice Referendum defeat in 2001, which some see as a watershed moment in Ireland‟s 
relationship with the European Union (O‟Brennan, 2004, 2009, 2010). The European Union 
(Scrutiny) Act of 2002 laid down the legislative basis for parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
legislative proposals in the Houses of the Oireachtas. Under the Act the Government is 
legally obliged to lay copies of all EU legislative proposals before both Houses of the 
Oireachtas together with a statement of the Minister outlining the content, purpose and likely 
implications for Ireland of the proposed measure.  
 
Whilst these innovations should be considered positively, Gavin Barrett (2008) maintains a 
note of caution, and suggests that while the various measures brought in through the 
European Union (Scrutiny) Act, 2002 were a clear improvement on the previous experience 
and are „undoubtedly welcome, their effectiveness in securing executive accountability 
remains open to doubt‟. There is a vast difference between „making recommendations‟ to 
ministers and having the power to change or at least substantially influence government 
policy. 
 
At the European level the Lisbon Treaty introduced changes to the role of national 
parliaments which have the potential to significantly enhance the part played by the 
Oireachtas and other parliaments in EU affairs. Much of the discussion about the Lisbon 
Treaty‟s protocols on national parliaments and subsidiarity revolved around the potential for 
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increasing the politicization and parliamentarization of EU politics. These measures included 
the following: 
 
-National parliaments are to receive all Commission documents, all instruments of legislative 
planning and all draft legislative acts that are sent to the European Parliament and the Council 
as well as agendas and minutes of Council meetings (Article 1 and article 2 of the Protocol on 
the role of national parliaments).  
 
-Under the mechanism commonly referred to as the „early warning system‟ (EWS), any 
chamber of a national parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a 
legislative act in the official languages of the Union, send to the presidents of the EP, 
Commission and the Council a reasoned opinion stating why it considers the draft in question 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Each national parliament has two votes 
and in the case of bicameral parliaments, each of the chambers has one vote. Where reasoned 
opinions on non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of 
all the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed (also called the 
„yellow card‟ procedure). The institution that has put forward the proposal may maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft and has to justify the decision. If, under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the reasoned opinions represent at least a simple majority of the votes, the 
Commission has to issue a reasoned opinion if it decides to maintain the proposal (the so-
called „orange card‟ procedure). In that case, if, by a majority of 55 per cent of the members 
of the Council or a simple majority of the votes cast in the EP, the legislator is of the opinion 
that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the draft shall be given 
no further consideration. 
 
-Member states can now bring actions for annulment on grounds of a breech of the 
subsidiarity principle before the European Court of Justice on behalf of their national 
parliaments. 
 
-National parliaments are now to be involved in the revision procedures of the Treaties and 
receive notification of applications for accession to the European Union. 
 
-Finally, there are also new provisions that encourage the deepening of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
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The powers conferred by the Lisbon Treaty on national parliaments may indeed be rather 
narrowly circumscribed and they in part depend on the support of other institutions. 
Nevertheless, national parliaments have obtained for the first time a formal role in EU 
policymaking. That is certainly significant and the Oireachtas should now be examining 
strategies for insinuating itself better into Ireland‟s decision-making machinery. Whilst the 
Lisbon Treaty has only been in force since December 2009 there are already signs that some 
national parliaments (or chambers thereof) are taking a proactive stand. In particular some 
parliaments which – like the Oireachtas – have been viewed as weak performers on the EU 
scene, seem now to be seizing the opportunity to develop a role for themselves. We can cite 
the UK House of Lords, for example, or the Czech Senate and the Upper Houses of Austria, 
Belgium, France and Germany.  
 
The Oireachtas should now be arguing for much more enhanced powers of oversight, scrutiny 
and control over Irish EU decision-making. The planned Constitutional Convention offers an 
important vehicle for securing such an enhanced role and the European Affairs Committee in 
particular should be asserting in the strongest possible terms the case for increasing its own 
powers.  
 
Conclusion 
If the Fiscal Compact is ratified by the people there will be a very clear argument to be made: 
the fiscal compact alone is not enough. If a yes vote is to be anything more than a vote out of 
fear, then additional measures are necessary. The deepening of the commitment of the 
member states of the Eurozone to a set of common rules and binding fiscal provisions should 
necessarily be accompanied by a social compact that generates the investments and social 
solidarity required to re-generate the European project and by measures to enhance 
democratic oversight at a time of increasing technocracy – including review of the overall 
constitutional implications of Europeanisation and a significant strengthening of the role of 
national parliaments across the EU. 
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